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In Just Silences, I wrote that justice today lies—in various ways—in the 
silences of legal texts.1 I suggested that different disciplines take different 
approaches not only to law, but also to silence and to justice. I criticized 
approaches that disregarded, downplayed, or otherwise dismissed the need to 
attend to silence and to justice in studying law.  
In what follows, I suggest further that taking seriously the difficult claim that 
justice lies in the silences of legal texts leads one to value precisely the kind of 
scholarship that recognizes the importance and limitations of texts, as artifacts and 
as utterances, with differing provenance, context, and meanings. Legal history 
strikes me as such an area of scholarship. Engagements with law and with its 
modern silences already happen in legal history. My task today is thus to exhort 
legal historians to continue to confront, even more tellingly than they already do, 
issues of justice and silence that other areas of legal scholarship ignore or simplify 
at their peril. In this spirit, I draw attention to how a rhetorically inflected legal 
history provokes reflection on justice in law. 
 The study of law as a series of speech acts that I consider below reorients 
current tired debates in the legal scholarship of several fields (Part I). It 
emphasizes—as in some sense does all history—the temporal aspect of law as an 
event, belonging to a tradition which is itself contested over time (Part II). Yet it 
also draws attention to how law differs from the subject matter of other sorts of 
 
 Professor of Rhetoric and Zaffaroni Family Chair in Undergraduate Education at the University of 
California at Berkeley. 
1. See generally MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF 
MODERN LAW (2005); see also Marianne Constable, Speech—Not God or Morality—Connects Our Law to 
Justice, BELIEVER (Oct. 2010), http://www.believermag.com/issues/201010/?read=interview 
_constable.  
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histories, insofar as law—as rhetorical phenomenon and event—appeals to justice 
(Part III). My points together offer, if not quite a “theory and method” for legal 
history, certainly a defense of some of its insights into legal texts and a challenge 
to those who fail to perceive the relevance of “law on the books” for 
understanding claims to justice.  
I. LAW AS SPEECH ACT 
Let me begin, in keeping with the terms of the original call for this 
conference, with a challenge to legal realism. Although more sophisticated 
scholars of law now widely disclaim the strict legal realist distinction between “law 
in action” and “law-on-the-books,” the distinction still holds in much of legal 
research and legal education. Legal realists and others—including historians—of 
the “law and . . .” persuasion who turn to the empirical study of law are indeed 
correct that formal rules do not describe legal behavior. They are correct that legal 
reasoning bereft of any correspondence with actuality is vacuous. But in 
distinguishing law-on-the-books from law-in-action and rejecting legal texts as 
simply law-on-the-books, realists—no less than theorists who would reduce law to 
statements of rules, as we shall see—move too quickly away from the ways that 
speech and writings happen and matter.  
Law-and-society scholarship, ostensibly in opposition to the professional 
legal academy, has long shown how law acts. The works of members of the 
Amherst reading group from the 1980s and 1990s and now those of the New 
Legal Realism emphasize how law acts from the bottom up as well as from the top 
down.2 In the bottom-up formulation, attention to legal ideology, legal 
consciousness, and law in everyday life does much to fill the old realist “gap” 
between action and books, or behavior and doctrine, but that filling is not as 
satisfying as it could be. Law-and-society scholarship, including that of linguists 
and anthropologists, continues to emphasize legal actions over legal speech and to 
focus on power, domination, and control in and of law. 
Law-and-society thereby shows its limitations. Actions may indeed speak 
louder than words, in law as elsewhere, as most of law-and-society claims. But 
using words—speaking or writing—is also action. And—what many who do not 
have ears behind their ears (as Nietzsche put it)3 do not understand: loudness may 
not always be what is most at issue. In the context of legal history’s reliance on 
textual materials (both law and history rely largely on written texts and their 
authority), a revitalized and explicitly rhetorically informed legal history hastens 
 
2. See work of John Brigham, Sally Merry, Christine Harrington, Austin Sarat, Susan Silbey, 
and others for examples of scholarship from Amherst reading group participants. For examples of 
New Legal Realism, see the Wisconsin Law Review’s 2005 issue, “New Legal Realism Symposium: Is 
it Time for a New Legal Realism?”, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335−745 (2005).  
3. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS 3 (Wordsworth Editions Limited 2007) 
(1889). 
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the death throes of the law-in-action/law-on-the-books distinction, insofar as it 
shows how law-on-the-books—whether legal doctrines or other sorts of 
utterances or written productions—are themselves acts, produced and circulated 
by different sorts of agents over time. 
Informed by an understanding of legal writing and speaking as practices, 
legal history reorients common misunderstandings of legal texts as static (and in 
Peter Goodrich’s work in this volume and elsewhere, of law as image-free).4 
Cornelia Vismann’s incredibly rich Files: Law and Media Technology, for instance, 
shows how different recording practices have shaped particular forms of law.5 
Practices and materials of documents and files have affected Western notions of 
truth, concepts of the state, and constructions of the subject.6 Vismann recounts 
with impressive detail how shifts from translating to legislating in Rome, from 
documents to records in the Middle Ages, from chancery to administrative 
government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and from administration 
to office techniques in the twentieth, correspond to changes in manner of rule. 
Particular ways of circulating, depositing, hoarding, copying, pasting, deleting, 
notarizing, storing, compiling, and indexing documents characterize different 
possibilities and actualities of law. The updating of the codices of imperial Rome, 
for example, differed from a local town crier’s transmission of news. The move 
from papyrus to parchment offers different concepts of time and of law,7 enables 
compilation,8 and corresponds to the rise of an administration that links the 
official character of its acts to their recording.9 Keeping files in public places, 
rather than in personal notebooks, allows copies to be made to prove legal 
claims.10 Emphasis on the evidence of law, rather than its transmission as news, 
takes reality to be what is found in the file. Formal public announcements also 
differ from dispatched letters. The silent reader of a sealed letter takes its 
content—and not the exact wording that is inseparable from the act of 
announcing—as imperial command. The appearance of certificates to represent an 
issuer’s authority means that format—seals and signatures, writing surface, and 
letter shape, which had been administrative practicalities during the Roman 
Empire—vouches for authenticity. It also makes forgery possible.11 Files today are 
not only used to administer, but are themselves administered. With the “self-
processing” files of the twentieth-century office, in contrast to chancery style and 
 
4. Peter Goodrich, Specters of Law: Why the History of the Legal Spectacle Has Not Been Written, 1 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 773 (2011). 
5. See generally CORNELIA VISMANN, FILES: LAW AND MEDIA TECHNOLOGY (Geoffrey 
Winthrop-Young trans. 2008).  
6. Id. at 7. 
7. Id. at 43. 
8. Id. at 44. 
9. Id. at 49. 
10. Id. at 52. 
11. Id. at 72−73. 
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accumulations in secretive state archives, censorship occurs before things are put 
on record.12 And, as the materiality of files becomes invisible and the physical file 
obsolete, data protection concerns the handling of only “the informational 
substrate of files” on computers. The disappearance of physical files thus 
simultaneously draws attention to the role files have played as technologies that 
have shaped Western legal institutions.13  
In addition to complicating the law-and-society distinction between an 
ineffective law on the books and a powerful (if also increasingly out-of-control) 
law in action, legal history’s presentation of texts wreaks havoc with philosophical 
legal positivism. Legal history in effect shows that context grants “legal” character 
to a text (or an action). Thus, in legal history, more is required for there to be law 
than a powerful agent or a simplistic positivism’s commanding authority. The 
much-maligned John Austin himself recognized the importance of context when 
he defined law not simply as command, but as the command of a sovereign, 
backed by threats that subjects are in the habit of obeying.14  
When legal history acknowledges both the dynamism of speech and writing 
and the necessity of context for grasping whether a phenomenon is law, it shares 
in the insights of a later Austin. Twentieth-century J.L. Austin famously argued 
that the success of a (non-nonsensical) utterance—the effectiveness of a 
command, for instance—depends on the context of its uttering or on what he 
called the “total speech situation.”15 For the ostensible speech act of command 
that is law to work, argue both Austin and Austin, supported by legal history, the 
circumstances must be right. Or, in J.L. Austin’s lingo, the “felicity” of what he at 
first calls a “performative utterance” and later an “illocutionary speech act” has 
certain requirements. Austin identifies “performative” utterances as utterances 
that do what they say in being said: promises, bets, warnings, commands, for 
instance. Over the course of his lectures, he shows that performative utterances 
do not require the first-person present indicative form (“I promise you that . . .”, 
for instance) by which he originally identified them. Both the locution, “I warn 
you that . . .” (which is in the form of an explicit performative), and the locution, 
“Look out!” for instance, warn. Austin then renames the performative function of 
an utterance its “illocutionary” aspect. He distinguishes the illocutionary aspect of 
a speech act (warning) from its locutionary aspect (He said to look out, or “Look 
out!”) and its contingent perlocutionary aspect, which describes the effect of what 
the utterance did (She was startled, or He saved her day). Sociolegal scholars tend 
to assess the perlocutionary effects of discourse. Legal scholars by contrast often 
focus on the propositional value of utterances or on what Austin called, in his 
 
12. Id. at 142. 
13. Id. at 15. 
14. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 253–54 (Hackett 
Publ’g Co. Inc. ed. 1998) (1832).  
15. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962). 
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early discussion, “constative” statements. 
For a speech act to succeed illocutionarily, according to Austin, then: there 
must be a convention or procedure for the act that includes the uttering of certain 
words by certain persons in certain circumstances; the persons and circumstances 
in a given situation must be the appropriate ones; the procedure must be executed 
correctly and also completely; and if certain thoughts or feelings are required, a 
participant must have those thoughts or feelings, intend to conduct themselves in 
accordance with them, and so conduct themselves.16 All parties to law today know 
this: procedure matters. Whether filing one’s taxes, ordering a computer, buying a 
car, taking out or foreclosing on a mortgage, the formalities—and more—must be 
observed to accomplish the act. Unless forms are filled out and fields filled in, all 
the way, on time, scanned or sent to the right office, signed by the proper parties, 
stating an appropriate cause of action, for instance, a claim fails to amount to a 
successful legal complaint. Objection, however warranted, to a witness’s comment 
called out by a courtroom spectator does not constitute a legal objection. A law 
professor or an English major’s better-argued and better-written opinion cannot 
substitute for that of the judge in a case. Just any Rex, in Lon Fuller’s words, 
cannot make Lex.17 Context—the conventions and circumstances surrounding an 
utterance of law—matter to its “success” as legal act, be it command or complaint 
or objection or ruling or something else.,  
The legal positivism that predominates in Western legal philosophy today 
associates law less with command, of course, than with a system of rules which, in 
some sense, establishes the very conditions of its own production of rules. (Here I 
have H.L.A. Hart in mind. His “concept of law” defines law as a system of 
primary and secondary rules. Hart understands primary rules to be the rules that 
citizens generally obey. Secondary rules, accepted by officials, designate the 
primary rules that bind Hartian officials as well as citizens.18) Yet despite its 
repudiation of law as command, today’s legal positivism continues to rehearse the 
old debate between legal positivism and natural law. According to legal positivism, 
the system of rules that is law has no necessary connection to justice. 
Contemporary natural law, by contrast, grounds the justice of what counts as law 
in morality or in “higher law.” While some claim that positivists and natural 
lawyers speak at cross-purposes, others deny the very salience of the debate. 
Positivist philosopher of law Liam Murphy, for instance, was asked following his 
recent Kadish Lecture at Berkeley how much the disagreement between positivism 
and nonpositivism as to the grounds of law matters. His answer: not much, except 
in “merely verbal” ways. Modern-day positivism, Murphy argues, accepts that 
 
16. Id. at 14–15. The lectures that follow suggest that the requirement that there be “certain” 
words may be too particular. 
17. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 2 (Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 1969). Fuller is 
concerned in particular with “the rule of law” as what makes law what it is.  
18. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1994).  
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judges may incorporate moral reasoning into their decision making within a 
positivistically defined system; nonpositivism, he claims, does not generally 
produce different results.19  
But results are not all that matters. Legal positivists and natural lawyers do 
indeed agree on some things. They agree that law—whether as rule or as right—
somehow tells us what to do. In the “telling” of law that is acknowledged by both 
sides, rhetorically savvy legal history again recognizes activities of knowledge 
production, of discovery and enactment, of dissemination and receipt of law. 
While in principle such activities need not happen through words, today they 
largely involve language (and, since nineteenth-century codification movements 
and twentieth-century restatements, writings). The telling of law takes place today 
through speech acts. And when law speaks, it claims authority, however implicitly. 
Murphy may thus be correct that disagreement as to the grounds of law matters 
little; but that law speaks suggests precisely that law and its disagreements cannot 
be dismissed as “merely” verbal.  
Law’s claims of authority are reinforced by particular institutions and carry 
with them particular traditions, as legal histories show.20 And claims of law are 
manifest not only in the acts of legal officials but also in the acts of those who 
would challenge a so-called law in the name of justice. Think of texts about the 
U.S. law of slavery in the nineteenth century, about civil rights in the twentieth, 
about international war crimes in the twenty-first. These texts have been 
deposited, hoarded, copied, pasted, deleted, censored, notarized, published, stored, 
compiled, annotated, digitized, presented at conferences. They are more than the 
artifacts of particular circulatory practices, however. They are also utterances, 
sometimes put to use in ways their authors never imagined, articulating through 
their speech acts claims, not always explicit, about justice and injustice. Speech 
acts of claiming bind law to issues of justice. An “issue” in law is that over which 
parties are joined and divided. Implicit in both the rules and institutions of 
Western law and in the claims of those who would contest aspects of that law are 
appeals to justice. The most authoritative spokespersons of law are called 
“justices.” But claims of law and appeals to justice are made no less by those who 
would contest a given law. Claims on behalf of and within the “system,” as well as 
claims made against it, appeal however silently, however strategically, however 
hypocritically, to justice. Those claims bind law to justice even—or perhaps 
especially—when law is unjust. Neither a God nor a higher law, but the claiming 
that goes on in legal speech acts, binds us to issues of justice.  
 
19. Liam Murphy, Herbert Peterfreund Professor of Law and Philosophy, New York 
University School of Law, Kadish Lecture at the University of California Berkeley School of Law 
(Feb. 23, 2010). 
20. On ancient and Biblical law, see work by David Daube. On Western law more generally, 
see DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION (1990). See also ANNABEL PATTERSON, READING HOLINSHED’S CHRONICLES (1994).  
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Claiming is only one (if perhaps a privileged one?) of the speech acts of law, 
however. Legal sources and actors complain, rebut, instruct, appeal, threaten, 
testify, swear, object, overrule, enact, appoint, find, dismiss, amend, approve, deny, 
declare, agree, promise, qualify, hold, sentence . . . . They act or “verb” in the 
name of the law and of its authority (whatever its source). Insofar as legal history 
reads legal texts for what they do and how they do it (for verbs and for adverbs), 
rather than for the truth of their representations and their classifications of 
persons and things (for nouns and rules) as is done in some legal education,21 the 
doings of law, its legal speech acts, emerge as events or occurrences that happen in 
or take time.  
II. LAW AS EVENT IN TIME 
When law becomes speech act, history tells stories of law as happenings and 
events, verbings and doings, rather than as derivations from or instantiations of 
statements of rules. Take a standard case that appears in some first-year criminal 
law casebooks, Morissette v. United States.22  
The usual way of teaching students to read (and brief) the case is to ask them 
for its issue, rule, analysis, and conclusion (following identification of parties, 
procedural status, description of facts and so forth).23 Morissette was convicted of 
conversion, for gathering from federal land spent bomb casings. Apparently 
thinking they were abandoned property, he sold them. 
A criminal law instructor, having established these facts, turns to the 
reasoning by which the Supreme Court reverses the appellate court’s affirmation 
of Morissette’s conviction. Students can then read Morissette for establishing that 
intention is a requisite element of criminal liability; that in omitting reference to 
intention and referring to “knowing conversion” in its statute, Congress did not 
intend to create a new category of crime (unwitting conversion); and that, where 
intent is an element of a crime, trial court instructions raising a presumption of 
intention from the evidence are in error.  
If however the opinion is read instead for what it does and indeed as it is 
written, Morissette becomes the story, itself a speech act, of the series of speech acts 
leading up to and comprising the Supreme Court judgment, again itself a speech 
act. The opinion reports that: under investigation, Morissette “voluntarily, 
promptly and candidly” told his story to investigators who nevertheless indicted 
him under a federal statute for “unlawfully, wil[l]fully and knowingly steal[ing] and 
 
21. See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK 
LIKE A LAWYER” (2007) for the ways students are taught to read and classify according to terms of 
legal authority.  
22. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
23. See discussion of case briefing in, for example, LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING 
AND ANALYSIS ch. 3 (6th ed. 2007); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL 
WRITING ch. 4 (4th ed. 2001).  
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convert[ing] property of the United States.” Indictment is of course a speech act. 
Morisette testified—another speech act—that he thought the casings were 
abandoned and that he had taken them “with no wrongful or criminal intent.” The 
trial court “convicted and sentenced” (speech act) him; the Court of Appeals 
affirmed (speech act), one judge dissented (speech act). The Supreme Court 
reversed (speech act) the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its opinion, the Supreme 
Court deals first with the appellate court’s interpretation of the statute enacted 
(speech act) by Congress, then with the trial judge’s erroneous instructions (speech 
act) to a jury. The Supreme Court argues (speech act) that given the trial evidence, 
the jury could legitimately have concluded (speech act) otherwise. 
First, the Supreme Court argues, the Court of Appeals “construe[d] 
omission” (here a speech act) of criminal intent from the Congressional statute as 
“dispensing with it.” But in interpreting (here again a speech act) the 
pronouncements (speech act) attributed to common-law commentators and state 
law, the Supreme Court holds (speech act) that “where Congress borrows terms of 
art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of 
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas . . . . [A]bsence of 
contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted 
definitions . . . .” The Supreme Court “finds [speech act] no grounds for inferring 
[speech act] any affirmative instruction [speech act] from Congress to eliminate 
intent from any offense with which this defendant was charged [another speech 
act].”  
Further, the Supreme Court “read[s] the record” (again, a speech act) for a 
theory of the case and finds (a speech act) that the trial court “erred” (speech act) 
in “instructing” (speech act) the jury as to “presumptive” intent (might presuming 
be a speech act?) insofar as such presumption allows the jury to make assumptions 
(like inferring, a speech act) that conflict with the presumption of innocence . . . . 
You get the idea! The opinion itself becomes part of a series of speech acts that 
make claims about the series of speech acts that claim to be, or to be in the name 
of, the law.  
Reading Morissette this way reinforces two earlier points. First, the speech acts 
of law involve actions—indicting, testifying, convicting, sentencing, affirming, 
dissenting, reversing—that at minimum must meet certain contextual 
requirements to count as examples of the performative utterances that they are— 
J.L. Austin’s felicity conditions. Second, legal speech acts, as actions or verbs, 
happen in time. The “rules” extracted from briefing a case, by contrast, are things 
or nouns, to which are attributed a kind of timeless existence. (Morissette, with its 
focus on the “intention” of Congress and of Morissette, also draws attention to 
adverbs or the manner in which actors undertake or carry out actions, including 
speech acts. I discuss the importance of adverbs to law and to telling stories of law 
and legal events elsewhere. In brief: just as grammar requires a complete sentence 
that includes a subject and predicate or a noun that verbs, so too a legal judgment 
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requires a subject who predicates in a particular way. The subject of legal judgment 
not only causes effects, but must be capable of doing so in an “intentional” or 
willed manner).  
To transform legal opinions from being static texts from which students 
extract noun-like rules into being part of an event in which judges actively state 
rules is a first step to understanding that law happens, if only as the action of 
stating rules. But this step is not enough. While stating rules is a speech act, to 
grasp law or even judicial behavior primarily as the stating of rules still accords law 
and judges too narrow a range of action.24 As we have seen, events of law involve 
many more legal speech acts than stating rules or, for that matter, commanding. 
Legal histories describe and thereby expand the contexts of such legal events, 
showing not just that law has a tradition that gives meaning to events, but that law 
itself constitutes a contested tradition in which particular practices may take on 
new meanings or disappear.25 (Further, as I develop elsewhere, grasping language 
solely as speech event or as the action of a subject also offers too narrow an 
understanding of language.26) 
While legal events can be told, their import for the tradition cannot be 
completely foretold. Who could have predicted that a medieval law writ by a 
widow who fails to win back her land could become a twenty-first-century 
example of “the thrill” of legal analysis?27 Or that the editing out of lawyers’ 
names (but not those of judges) in casebooks suggests that law students are not 
taught how lawyers in past cases “had a sense of injustice, a sense of wrongness 
about the system, and then used their lawyering skills to bring about a change. 
And they were successful.”28 As legal history moves beyond the actualities of 
sociolegal studies that downplay speech and writings, beyond the abstractions of 
mainstream legal philosophy that rejects justice, and beyond the statements of 
rules of professional legal education, to study events that take place over time, it 
shows how “justice” has been said—and unsaid—sometimes surprisingly, in texts 
of law. Note the course of the famous U.S. v. Carolene Products footnote.29 Stories 
of how a bill gets passed—or fails to pass—of what an opinion—or a footnote or 
a phrase—meant and has come to mean, of how a document was lost and has 
 
24. For an account of the “courtesy” of judges, see KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE 
POLITICAL EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: ACCEPTABLE HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(2010).  
25. In addition to Vismann and texts mentioned in earlier notes, see for instance, ROGER 
BERKOWITZ, THE GIFT OF SCIENCE: LEIBNIZ AND THE MODERN TRADITION (2005); SHAI LAVI, 
THE MODERN ART OF DYING: A HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); KARL 
SCHOEMAKER, SANCTUARY AND CRIME IN THE MIDDLE AGES, 400–1500 (2011). 
26. MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORD IS OUR BOND: HOW LEGAL SPEECH ACTS 
(forthcoming). 
27. Thomas Lund, Medieval Law Should Be Taught, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 540–44 (2008). 
28. Frank Tuerkheimer, A Short Essay on the Editing of Cases in Casebooks, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
531−32 (2008). 
       29. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
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been found—lead one to wonder about what may yet be said and unsaid, not only 
in texts of law, but also in those of history.30  
III. LAW AS CLAIM TO JUSTICE 
When sociolegal studies emphasize action at the expense of speech and law 
schools reduce law to statements of rules and economic calculations, while legal 
philosophy exiles justice from its bailiwick, history and rhetoric take up the 
claims—explicit and implicit, past and present—to justice in legal speech. They 
reveal the particularity of law. They show how law matters in a different way than 
do the other phenomena that are the central concerns of most social and cultural 
histories.  
Social and cultural histories either seek what is typical, from which to 
generalize (as in the empirical research of social sciences), or they explore what is 
presumed unique—whether spectacular or marginal—from which to glean a 
cultural imaginary of secret desires and suppressed anxieties. But law always 
matters in both ways, as that from which to generalize and as that which reveals 
more than itself. Legal histories show law as speech act and as event to be both 
typical of and unique in society. Legal histories depict law as both representative 
and atypical of its culture.  
The history of law matters not only because what is done through law is 
both typical and revealing of fantasy, however. Legal history matters also insofar 
as it reminds us that “the name of the law” implicitly invoked in claims about a 
given law evokes issues of justice and injustice for those who speak or hear law. 
How acts or events or claims or utterances “in the name of the law” have mattered 
is the peculiar contribution of history to legal scholarship. That legal history shows 
that law has mattered as a name and as an act that was linked—again, however 
hypocritically, strategically, desperately, defensively—to issues of justice raises 
questions about the future.  
Will the aspect of law that is bound to issues and claims of justice continue 
to matter? The best legal history raises just such a question about modern law. 
Texts of legal history recall and name, however silently, issues not only of 
sociolegal power, philosophical system, and academic rules, but also of justice. 
They draw attention to what has been and lead us to wonder what will become of 




30. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975) 
(providing an unexpected endorsement of the rule of law).  
